Wladimir Klitschko vs Samuel Peter 2

Wladimir Klitschko retained the principal heavyweight championships by knocking out Samuel Peter in the tenth round before approximately 43,000 spectators at the Commerzbank-Arena in Frankfurt on September 11, 2010. Klitschko weighed 247 pounds and defended the International Boxing Federation, World Boxing Organisation, International Boxing Organisation and Ring magazine titles. Peter weighed 241 pounds and entered as the IBF’s leading available challenger. Referee Robert Byrd ended the contest at one minute 22 seconds of the tenth round after Peter had been put down heavily.

The Nigerian had replaced Alexander Povetkin, the original mandatory challenger. Povetkin failed to attend the announcing press conference and withdrew on the advice of his trainer, Teddy Atlas, who considered him unprepared for Klitschko. Peter’s selection supplied a familiar element. Five years earlier he had knocked Klitschko down three times in Atlantic City but lost a unanimous decision. That contest had been a severe test of Klitschko’s composure and stamina. By the rematch, the Ukrainian had become a more guarded, methodical champion, while Peter had held and lost the WBC title.

Peter began aggressively, attempting to move beneath Klitschko’s jab and bring his hooks into use. He landed a left hook to the head during the opening round, but the champion remained at long range and replied with a firm right hand late in the session. The difference in height and reach was immediately apparent. Peter was required to cross too much ground before punching, and Klitschko either stepped away or held whenever the challenger reached close quarters.

Klitschko increased his authority in the second round. A pair of right-left combinations stunned Peter and obliged him to retreat. The challenger continued trying to duck beneath the jab, but his movements were increasingly anticipated. Klitschko’s left hand repeatedly checked the advance, after which the straight right followed down the centre. When Peter did reach the champion’s chest, Klitschko tied up his arms and waited for Byrd to separate them.

The same method controlled the middle rounds. Klitschko’s jab was used both as a scoring punch and a barrier, striking Peter before the challenger could set his feet. Swelling developed around Peter’s right eye, further reducing his ability to judge the incoming blows. His attacks became isolated lunges rather than sustained assaults. The champion gave him few opportunities to throw the wide hooks which had caused such difficulty in their first meeting.

A hard uppercut late in the sixth round hurt Peter and nearly brought him down. He remained upright and completed the round, but his resistance was becoming increasingly passive. Klitschko continued to score with the jab and right hand while avoiding unnecessary exchanges. Peter showed courage and kept the possibility of landing one heavy punch alive, yet he could not establish the position from which to deliver it.

The statistical record demonstrated the extent of Klitschko’s control. He landed 142 punches at an accuracy rate of 28 per cent, while Peter connected with only 35 at 18 per cent. The challenger landed fewer than ten punches in every round and averaged only 21 attempts per round, less than half the usual heavyweight output recorded by CompuBox. Klitschko’s clinching contributed to that scarcity, but the principal cause was the speed and authority of his jab.

By the tenth, Peter was swollen, tired and offering little effective return. Klitschko drove him towards the ropes and attacked with greater commitment than he had shown during the earlier rounds. An uppercut lifted Peter’s head, and a left hook sent him heavily to the floor. Byrd began the count but stopped before completing it when Peter’s condition made further action unnecessary. The knockout was decisive and left no question of the result.

The rematch bore little resemblance to the uncertainty of their first contest. Peter had entered that earlier meeting as an unbeaten and feared puncher, while Klitschko was still repairing his standing after stoppage defeats. In Frankfurt, the champion controlled every phase, denied Peter room to work and increased his attack only when the challenger had been sufficiently weakened. The victory continued the Klitschko brothers’ command of the heavyweight division, with Wladimir holding the IBF and WBO championships and Vitali in possession of the WBC title.

The first fight made Wladimir Klitschko; the rematch showed how far he had travelled. In 2005, Samuel Peter was unbeaten, feared and strong enough to put Klitschko down three times. He later became a champion himself, but by this meeting Vitali had already methodically dismantled him, and he no longer carried the same menace.

Peter’s plan was obvious: duck beneath the jab, close the gap and swing hooks. The problem was that Klitschko knew precisely what was coming. He kept Peter at the end of that ramrod left hand, stepped away from the first rush and tied him up whenever he reached the chest. It was not pretty, but it was technically ruthless.

Peter was poor because Klitschko made him poor. He could not set his feet, his right eye swelled, and he spent the night lunging from too far away. A hard uppercut hurt him in the sixth, and the punishment became increasingly one-sided.

Klitschko finally opened up in the tenth, driving Peter towards the ropes before an uppercut and left hook put him down heavily. The stoppage was inevitable. Five years earlier, Klitschko had survived Peter; this time he reduced him to a target.